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The purpose of this article is to clarify and defend certain ideas 
about rights and responsibilities that I set forth in an earlier article 
entitled "Legalism and Medical Ethics." (Hereafter referred to as 
LME.)1 I shall be specifically concerned with answering criticisms of 
the distinction between rights and responsibilities that have been 
I~ brought against it in two recently published articles. 2 
In LME, I compared and contrasted two different conceptual 
models for dealing with problems in medical ethics in general and 
more specifically with problems concerning the relationship between 
physicians and their patients. I called them "the model of rights" and 
"the model of responsibilities." In commenting on what I called 
t "legalism," represented by the model of rights, I observed that the 
ethical vocabulary employed in the current literature in medical ethics 
is almost entirely restricted to the language of rights. I argued in rather 
specific terms that this choice of a narrow, specialized vocabulary has 
the effect of limiting our understanding of some of the basic issues of 
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medical ethics and diverts our attention from other important issues 
that are not directly related to questions of rights. In general, my 
position is that the vocabulary of ethics is a very rich one indeed. 
There are many different ways of conceptualizing moral relationships 
and a multiplicity of useful conceptual models for dealing with moral 
problems and issues besides the language of rights. In this vein, I did 
not intend to suggest that the language of rights be abandoned 
altogether; rather my underlying position was anti-reductionist. I was 
simply pleading for greater conceptual flexibility and less slavish 
adherence to a narrow and restricted ethical vocabulary. To use 
"rights" as an all-purpose conceptual tool in medical ethics is a bit like 
using a meat cleaver for every cutting purpose - for sewing as well as 
for brain surgery. Ronald Dworkin likens rights to trumps; but I 
should add, it is not always good or necessary to play trumps. 3 
The two critical articles with which I am concerned here are reduc-
tionist in effect, if not in intent, for they imply that in dealing with l' 
problems in medical ethics, one has to choose between the concept of 
rights and the concept of responsibilities. However, interestingly 
enough, the authors of the two articles approach the issues quite 
differently and reach exactly opposite conclusions. In the first article, 
Sara Ann Ketchum and Christine Pierce opt for the language of rights 
against the language of responsibilities. In the second article, on the 
other hand, Clifton Perry contends that the distinction between rights 
and responsibilities is a "distinction without a difference" and that the " 
difference between the two concepts is therefore simply a difference 
in "defeasibility" (i.e., stringency) and not a qualitative one at all. As 
a result, he discards the ethics of rights (in my sense) in favor of an 
ethics of responsibilities. Accordingly, insofar as both articles are 
conceptually reductionistic, either in favor of reducing the language of 
medical ethics to the language of rights or of reducing it to the lan-
guage of responsibilities, it is easy to see how they could not fail to 
come to conclusions that are inconsistent with mine, which 
presuppose an anti-reductionist approach. 
The Ambiguities of "Rights" 
Although I did not emphasize the point as strongly as I should have 
in LME, one of the chief difficulties in most present-day medical 
ethics discussions which refer to rights is that they hardly ever explain 
which particular meaning of the term " rights" is involved, for 
example, in expressions like "the right to life ," " the right to medical 
care," "the right to die," "the right to an abortion," "the right to see 
one's medical record," "the right to have a second opinion," "the 
right to refuse treatment," etc. (I assume that we are speaking here of 
moral and not purely legal rights .) 5 In my discussion of rights in LME, 
in order to avoid being trapped by the ambiguities of the term 
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"rights," I tried to specify as carefully as I could what I meant by the 
term. The concept of rights that I intended in that article is a widely 
accepted and ethically important sense of "rights" that might be 
called " choice-rights."6 I shall henceforth refer to this sense of rights 
as rights in the strong sense. However, I did not specifically mention 
other senses of "rights" that are found in the literature of medical 
ethics. Since my failure to mention them may account for various 
misunderstandings of my position in LME, it will be worthwhile for 
me to discuss briefly some other concepts of rights. In addition to the 
concept of rights in the strong sense, there are several concepts of 
rights in what might be called extended senses. Under the latter I shall 
include the right not to be harmed, need-rights, and what I shall call 
"implemental rights." I shall discuss these various concepts of rights 
presently, but first I need to say more about rights in the strong sense. 
Rights in the strong sense are essentially rights to choose. As such, 
they are based on the notion of freedom of choice, which Locke 
describes as "a liberty to dispose and order, as he lists, his person, his 
actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance of 
those (natural) laws under which he is; and therein not to be subject 
to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own." 7 Freedom 
of choice in this sense is often referred to (incorrectly) as moral 
autonomy.8 Thus, Ketchum and Pierce say that rights talk focuses on 
persons as "autonomous agents" and "in talking about patient's rights 
we portray the patient as an autonomous agent" (p. 276). As Benn 
points out, it would be more accurate to use the term "autarchy" 
rather than "autonomy" in this context, for "autarchy" represents the 
model of a "chooser" rather than of a moral ideal suggested by the 
term "nomos" (i.e., law).9 
A distinctive feature of rights in the strong sense, in contrast to 
rights in extended senses, is that it is perfectly intelligible to say of 
such rights that a person has a right to do wrong, that is, that he can 
exercise his right wrongly; for, after all, he can choose wrongly and his 
right gives him the freedom to choose "as he listeth." 10 In contrast, 
rights in the extended senses of "rights" that I shall consider presently 
entail that no one can have a right to do what is wrong, i.e., one only 
has a right to do what is right. The right to do wrong, which only 
characterizes rights in the strong sense, includes the right to make 
mistakes, the right not to help others in need, and even the right, 
under certain circumstances, to hurt others or to hurt oneself. 
Inasmuch as the exercise of a right in the strong sense is a function 
of the right-holder's will, his choice rights in the strong sense can, as I 
observed in LME, be waived. (In the extended senses, rights cannot be 
waived.) For the same reason, by virtue of his right, a person's choice 
is binding on others without regard to whether or not what is willed 
(or chosen) is reasonable. 11 In general, then, if a person has a right in 
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the strong sense, his choice is both a necessary and a sufficient condi-
tion for it to be binding. In other words, rights in the strong sense 
become effective on demand, that is, on being demanded and claimed 
by a "will." The essentially discretionary or arbitrary character of 
rights in the strong sense that their connection with choice and will 
entails is what I intended to convey by calling them "peremptory." 12 
Historically and conceptually rights in the strong sense are assim-
ilated to property rights, with which they have many features in 
common. For if one has a property right in something, say, Black-
acres, then one can do whatever one chooses with it. For, other things 
being equal, a person's having a property right in a thing is logically 
independent of what he intends or wants to do with that thing. The 
distinctive thing about a property right is that it confers on the owner 
the freedom to do whatever he chooses to do with his property and 
prohibits others from interfering with the exercise of his choice. 1 3 
Insofar as a person's body is construed as part of his property, a 
person has somewhat the same kind of rights over his body as he has 
over his other possessions, i.e., to do what he wants with it and to 
exclude interference by others in what he chooses to do with his 
body. A direct violation of one's property rights, including the integrity 
of one's body, is legally regarded as trespass. 14 
The seemingly paradoxical aspects of rights in the strong sense dis-
appear when we realize that rights talk is not really so much about 
the rights of the right-holder as it is about the obligations owed by 
rights-owers to the right-holder. 15 For rights consist both legally and 
ethically in a relationship between a right-holder and right-owers and 
the rights of the one are reflected in correlative obligations of 
others.16 The shift in focus from right-holder to right-ower is por-
trayed very graphically by Hart when he writes of the bonds between 
right-holder and right-ower that "the precise figure is not that of two 
persons bound by a chain, but of one person bound, the other end of 
the chain lying in the hands of another to use if he chooses ."17The 
latter, of course, may choose foolishly, mistakenly or wrongly; yet the 
rights-ower has an obligation to do or refrain from doing what the 
right-holder chooses. It is apparently this aspect of rights that 
Ketchum and Pierce are thinking of when they speak of a person's 
right to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds or "even for 
reasons of vanity" (p. 277). 
As Hart and others have pointed out, inasmuch as the concept of a 
right in the strong sense has its basis in the right-holder's "autono-
mous" (= autarchic) will, i.e., his ability to choose, it can be attributed 
only to "adult human beings capable of choice." Thus, animals and 
babies, perhaps even children, cannot have that kind of right, simply 
because they do not have the requisite capacity to choose. A fortiori, 
the notion of a fetus having a right or of having a right against a dead 
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person would be logically absurd if "rights" is used in the strong sense. 
Hence, Perry's examples, just mentioned, are beside the point, for the 
rights I was concerned with in LME were rights in the strong sense. On 
the other hand, Ketchum and Pierce, who are quite clearly using the 
notion of rights in the strong sense, can consistently attribute the 
rights of which they speak only to adult human beings who have 
complete control over their faculties, i.e., are "autonomous" 
(= autarchic). 
Extended Senses of "Rights" 
Let us now turn to some extended senses of "rights." I shall con-
sider only four of them here, because they are the ones encountered 
most frequently in writings on medical ethics. 18 As I have already 
pointed out, rights ill these extended senses imply that exercising a 
right is eo ipso doing somethillg right, i.e., one never has a right (in the 
extended sense) to do wrong. Thus, an act of will or choice is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to activate a right ill the extended sense and 
one cannot waive a right in this sense. Therefore, unlike rights in the 
strong sense, rights in the extended sense are not peremptory. 19 
The first extended sense of "rights" is a trivial one where having a 
right to do something simply means that it is not wrong to do it and, 
conversely, havillg no right to do something simply means that it is 
wrong to do it. 20 I mention this trivial sense merely in order to warn 
agaillst slipping into it in discussions of rights. Rights in this sense have 
completely lost the property of being "trumps." 
A second and less trivial extended sense of "rights" will be called 
the harm sense of right. This is a person's right not to be wrongfully 
harmed; if he has this right, then others have the correlative obligation 
not to harm him wrongfully. 21 In this sense of rights, the deliberate 
infliction of any sort of wrongful harm on a person is taken to be a 
violation of his rights . It follows that if rights are understood in this 
way, then the whole of the Decalogue could be translated into a Bill 
of Rights: the right not to be killed, the right not to have one's 
property stolen, etc. However, the identification of every harmful act 
of this sort as a violation of rights does not appear to add anything 
more to its wrongfulness . Indeed, perhaps it even dimillishes the 
wrongfulness; for there seems to be something strange in accepting 
this translation of harms into rights language, which implies that one is 
saying such things as that a woman has a right not to be raped, that 
the Jews in Germany had a right not to be massacred in the gas 
chambers, or that people have a right not to be tortured, etc. Instead 
of strengthening the moral condemnation of these evils, the use of 
rights language to categorize the evils in such cases has the effect of 
trivializing them.22 It should be observed in passing that, if there are 
harm rights, such rights, unlike rights in the strong sense, can be 
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attributed to babies and animals, perhaps to fetuses and possibly even 
to physical objects like the environment or the Mona Lisa! It should 
be noted that some of Perry's examples seem to be about rights in the 
harm sense. 
Another closely related extended sense of "rights" gives us what I 
call need-rights. Such rights are based on needs and create correlative 
obligations in others to fill them. To make sense of the notion of 
need-rights, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish needs from wants, 
choices, or interests, for otherwise we would be forced to accede to 
the proposition that everybody has a right to whatever he wants in the 
sense that, other things being equal, others have an obligation to give 
him what he wants. Unlike wants, which may be arbitrary and capri-
cious, needs are objective and "rational," in senses that could be 
specified. This difference can be seen in the fact that, although a 
person may know better than others what he wants, someone else may 
be a better judge of what he needs. For example, although a patient 
may want to have a finger amputated, a doctor may be a better judge 
of whether or not he needs to have it amputated. 23 Furthermore, it 
should be pointed out that the concept of a need-right implies that, 
regardless of whether or not the patient wants a certain treatment or 
even if he refuses it, if he really needs it then he has a right to it in the 
need sense of right and it would be wrong for him to refuse because to 
do so would violate his own right! (Of course, in the strong sense of 
right he would have a right to refuse.) 
Still, I submit that even if a need of an especially pressing sort 
creates some sort of prima facie claim on others in the sense that, 
other things being equal, others ought to try to meet the need, it does 
not follow that anything is added by calling needs "rights," except 
that in some situations it might be permissible to use coercion to 
fulfill a pressing need. The assumption that other people's needs can 
create duties only because they are rights exemplifies the impoverish-
ment of ethical language that I have already complained about. Thus, 
with regard to Perry's example of the starving man in need of food, I 
would contend that we ought to help, not because he has a right or 
even as an act of supererogation, but simply because he desperately 
needs food and we have it to give. An ethics of responsibility is, in this 
case, more humane than an ethics of rights! Again, as with rights in 
the harm sense, it should be pointed out that rights in the needs sense 
may be attributed to babies, to animals, and to fetuses (at least when 
they are fairly well developed). 
It is clear from Perry's examples that he has in mind rights in an 
extended sense of one sort or another, e.g., either of rights in the 
harm or in the needs sense. For, as I have just pointed out, if a fetus 
could be said to have rights, these rights could only be rights in one or 
other of these senses. 
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Indeed, Perry's interesting discussion of the "right to life" shows 
quite clearly that this alleged right, when attributed to fetuses, is an 
amalgam of a harm-right and a need-right, and not a right in the strong 
sense at all. 24 But, inasmuch as my remarks on rights in LME were 
concerned only with rights in the strong sense, Perry's comments on 
rights are beside the point as far as my article is concerned. My own 
position is that harms and needs can stand on their own feet, as it 
were, as far as ethics is concerned and it is unnecessary and misleading 
to assume that they could have ethical import only if they are labeled 
as rights. Assuming that this is the main point of Perry's attack on 
rights, I think that I can accept much of what he says about relation-
ships and needs, although, of course, I would have to reject what he 
says about rights, because I mean something different from what he 
means by "rights." 
Finally, there is a fourth extended sense of rights which is especially 
important for medical ethics. Rights in this sense might be called 
impiementai rights. They are the rights a person has to the necessary 
means for carrying out his obligations, duties and roles. Thus, it has 
been traditionally held that the state (the Prince) has certain (imple-
mental) rights over its citizens, e.g., to exercise coercion over them in 
some form or other, because it needs such rights to carry out its duty 
to secure justice, prevent crime and preserve the peace. The rights of 
parents over their children might be regarded as implemental rights in 
the same sense, for they need them in order to carry out their parental 
duties to care for their children, to nourish and educate them, etc. 
Sometimes it is alleged that physicians have similar implemental rights 
that are necessary to carry out their task of caring for their patients, 
e.g., the right to freedom from interference, the right to decide about 
treatment, the right to certain kinds of information, and so on. Histor-
ically, the derivation of rights from duties, as reflected in the notion 
of an implemental right, has provided an important rationale for 
rights. For example, according to some philosophers in the Thomist 
tradition, the rights of persons follow from the natural law and 
acquire their authority from the natural law itself (or from God 's 
will), because it is necessary for persons to have these rights in order 
to fulfill their duties under the natural law (e .g., to God).25 An inter-
esting argument using the implemental concept of rights is given by 
Albert Jonson, who uses this particular concept as a basis for certain 
right s of doctors, e.g., their rights to autonomy and to non-interfer-
ence , on the grounds that they are necessary means for fulfilling their 
obligations correlative to the rights of people to health care. 26 
Before concluding this general review of different senses of "right," 
I want once more to emphasize how important it is for writers using 
the t erm to specify which particular sense of "rights" they have in 
mind. Otherwise , in their discussions they will be arguing past each 
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other, simply because they are using "rights" in different senses. (I 
have pointed out how this is so in Perry's critique of LME.) I also want 
to add that there are many other ways of classifying rights, as well as 
many other kinds of rights that I have failed to mention. The princi-
pium divisionis of the classification adopted here relates to the kind of 
moral rationale that is offered for the particular rights being discussed; 
it is this aspect of rights, i.e., their grounding, that is most pertinent to 
the issues raised by my critics. 
Defeasibility and How Rights Become Inoperative 
Perry's claim that the distinction between rights and responsibilities 
is a distinction without a difference rests to a large extent on his use 
of two words, "peremptory" and "defeasible." He argues that rights 
are not peremptory but defeasible, and in that regard they are similar 
to responsibilities. Consequently, he concludes, the distinction 
between rights and responsibilities breaks down and merely reflects a 
"difference in defeasibility of obligatory relationships ... rather than 
a qualitative difference in such relationships." 
It is evident, however, that, in his critique of LME, Perry assigns 
"peremptory" an entirely different meaning from the one that I had 
in mind in LME. As I used it, it was intended to capture the core 
meaning of rights in the strong sense. 27 Perry, on the other hand, 
seems to mean by "peremptory" something like "absolute" or 1 
"unconditional." His use of the term "defeasibility" also presents 
difficulties for again, he departs from the standard usage of the term 
and uses it to mean something like the opposite of absolute or uncon-
ditional.28 Quite apart from the choice of words, Perry brings up 
some important questions about the absoluteness and uncondition-
ality of rights that need to be discussed. I find it easiest to treat them 
by subsuming them under the general question: how do rights become 
inoperative, i.e., of no effect? There are three ways in which this can 
happen. 
To begin with, a right might become inoperative simply by being 
shown not to exist! Thus, under ordinary circumstances, I have no 
right to refuse treatment for you: the right in question is non-existent. 
I never had it. Sometimes a right may be rendered non-existent 
through some act or other that cancels or annuls it; for example, one 
person's property right in a thing is extinguished when he sells it to 
someone else. Again, a right may be forfeited, i.e., taken away, as 
when a criminal forfeits his right to liberty. A person may also lose 
some of his rights by becoming incompetent, e.g., he loses his right to 
make certain decisions about his medical treatment. Exactly how and 
why rights are inoperative in this sense depends obviously on what 
kinds of rights, what senses of "rights," we are concerned with. 
Another and quite different way in which a right can become 
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inoperative is by being waived by the right-owner, either explicitly or 
tacitly. In cases involving invasive treatment, patients generally waive 
their rights to refuse. It should be noted that one can only waive a 
right if one already has it and one does not necessarily give away a 
right completely by waiving it. Even when a person waives a right on a 
particular occasion, it still remains his right, to use again if he chooses. 
Sometimes a person can withdraw a waiver, as when a person changes 
his mind about consenting to a certain kind of medical treatment. The 
details of where, when and what are the effects of waiving a right are 
beyond the scope of this essay. But, as I pointed out earlier, only 
rights in the strong sense can be waived. 
Finally, a right may become inoperative because it conflicts with 
another right, say, of another person. We find a lot of nonsense in 
discussions of so-called "conflicts of rights" as when, for example, one 
right is said to "override" or "outweigh" another right, making the 
latter (following Ross) only a "prima facie" right or (in Perry's sense) 
a "defeasible" right. Such talk, however, systematically conflates out-
weighing and overriding with annulling, that is, the first with the third 
way of becoming inoperative. 
There are two ways in which rights might be said to conflict. First, 
your right to Blackacres might be said to conflict with my right to 
Blackacres; but that means only that our two claims to Blackacres are 
incompatible; in that case, one person's having the right to Blackacres 
cancels and excludes the other person's right; he has no right. On the 
other hand, one person's right might be said to conflict with the right 
of another in the sense that it is physically impossible for someone to 
fulfill both of them; in that case, neither of the parties thereby loses 
his right in the sense that it is cancelled or annulled; what happens is 
that one of the rights is simply suspended - put on ice, so to speak. 
To say that it is suspended means that if per contra it were (or 
becomes) possible to fulfill both rights, both of them should be 
fulfilled. 
It may be easier to see what is involved in this kind of "conflict of 
rights" if we approach the problem from the point of view of the 
right-ower rather than from that of the right-holder. If we do so, we can 
interpret the conflict just mentioned as essentially a conflict between 
different correlative obligations owed by a right-ower. Thus, so-called 
"conflicts of rights" would be reducible to conflicts of obligations, 
i.e., moral dilemmas. 29 An example may help to clarify this analysis. 
Consider the case of a pregnant woman who refuses treatment, 
thereby endangering the life of a baby she is about to bear; there are a 
number of rights that might be involved here, not only the mother's 
right, but also the father's right, society's right, the baby's right, etc. 
The health care provider (and the state) is faced with opposite and 
incompatible obligations, one to respect the mother's right to refuse 
May, 1982 129 
and the other to preserve the baby's life. It is, for physical reasons, 
impossible to do both and so the right-ower has to choose which to do 
and which not to do. But in choosing for the baby, he is not denying 
the mother's right in the sense that he denies that she has the right; 
rather, he is simply admitting that he cannot fulfill both of his 
correlative obligations: impossibilium nulla obligatio est. 30 That in 
such cases the right is not extinguished (annulled) but only'suspended 
may be seen in other cases of inability to perform where the right-
ower is required to provide some sort of compensation, if possible, as 
when a piece of property is seized by eminent domain. The distinction 
I am making should be clear if we consider the case of a person who is it 
unable to pay two debts because he does not have enough money. The 
debt that is not paid is not eo ipso cancelled and the creditor's right 
extinguished; rather, it is simply suspended (as in a moratorium). 
In general, then, it seems preferable to hold to the position that 
rights, if they are valid, cannot be overridden, that is, rendered of no ~ 
effect, except in the indirect sense that the right-owers, the other 
parties in the rights relationship who have the correlative obligations, 
are unable to honor them all under the circumstances. In this way, the 
absoluteness of rights, if you wish, their "peremptoriness," can be 
saved while room is made for the kind of flexibility demanded by the 
real world of contingent impossibilities; at the same time, the distinc-
tion can be preserved between extinguishing and suspending a right 
along the lines that I have suggested. ~ 
It follows from this analysis that rights in the strong sense are, in 
important respects, qualitatively different from need-rights and harn:-
rights, and from what were called "responsibilities" in LME. Rights in 
the strong sense are absolute - black and white; they cannot be 
weighed against each other - my liberty is not to be measured against 
yours. These rights are not "defeasible" in Parry's sense of the word, 
that is, outweighable; they can only be rendered inoperative in the 
three ways indicated, namely, by being extinguished (annulled, for-
feited), waived or suspended. On the other hand, harms and needs and 
the associated rights and responsibilities are not rendered inoperative 
in the three ways mentioned but, unlike rights in the strong sense, 
they can be compared and weighed against each other; and so can the 
corresponding responsibilities. One harm or one need may outweigh 
another morally and the corresponding responsibility with respect to 
the weightier claim may be more stringent than another responsibility 
with respect to another less weightier claim, that is, it would be 
morally preferable to pursue one rather than the other. If my conten-
tions about these differences are accepted, then Perry's claim that the 
difference between rights and responsibilities is a distinction without a 
difference along with his attempted assimilation of rights to responsi-
bilities must be rejected. 
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Equality 
From the critical comments made in the two articles on the ques-
tion of equality, it is clear that my brief remarks in LME on this 
subject have been misunderstood. Thus, Ketchum and Pierce complain 
that my arguments overlook "the fact of inequality of power between 
the parties" (i.e., physician and patient), which it is the purpose of the 
rights model to rectify. They conclude that in downgrading the model 
of rights, I am conferring "unquestioned moral authority" on the 
physician. Since this outcome is exactly the opposite of what I 
intended in LME, which was to defend a non-authoritarian conception 
of the physician-patient relationship, I obviously need to explain more 
clearly what I had in mind about equality. 
Perry also seems to have had some difficulty in understanding my 
remark that the rights model, like a contractual model, presupposes an 
"antecedent equality." It is clear that there are a number of different 
senses of "equality," which need to be kept separate. There is, of 
course, one sense in which a person enters a contractual relationship in 
order to overcome an inequality, a disparity, e.g., my not having what 
you want and your not having what I want. What I had in mind in 
using the term "antecedent equality" for a rights-relationship, was 
simply that the model of rights in the strong sense presupposes that all 
the parties involved are "adult human beings capable of choice," who 
on that account have an equal right to be free. H Now sometimes, of 
course, patients have this equal capacity to exercise choice when they 
first meet with their physicians and in such cases they would be ante-
cedently equal in the sense intended. However, many physician-
patient relationships are initiated under circumstances where the 
patient is not a free and equal agent at all. He may be entirely 
incapable of making a choice, e.g., he may be in a coma or helpless in 
some way or other; and if the initial encounter is an emergency, he will 
have no opportunity to shop around or to bargain with his physician. 
In such situations, patients begin their relationship to physicians as 
unequals, and the physician has a lot of power to determine what 
happens. But as a patient recovers, he gradually regains equal status 
with the physician and can relate to him as a free and equal agent. 
What I want to emphasize is that, even though the relationship starts 
as an unequal one, subsequently every effort should be made by all of 
the parties, especially physician and patient, to equalize the relation-
ship as much and as quickly as possible. Indeed, restoring equality, or 
bringing it about might be included as one of the aims of medical 
treatment. 32 
In their critique of LME, Ketchum and Pierce begin by attacking 
my suggestion that the physician-patient relationship be regarded as a 
kind of friendship. In citing Aristotle on friendship to illustrate what I 
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meant, I did not think that my readers would assume that I was 
thereby committed to everything that Aristotle says about friendship, 
including what he says about the inequality of men, women and 
slaves.33 My position would be that what is basically wrong with 
Aristotle's account is not what he says about friendship but what he 
says about equality and inequality, superiority and inferiority, virtue 
and merit, and the kind of authoritarianism that he bases on them.34 I 
could as well have cited Kant, whose grossly disregarded discussion of 
friendship is somewhat like Aristotle's except that it emphasizes 
equality. 3 5 Perhaps what is most important is their contention that 
everyone needs friends. 
The position taken by Ketchum and Pierce seems to be a very 
strong one, namely, that the physician-patient relationship never can 
be and never ought to be a personal relationship such as exists 
between friends (philia), e.g., one in which the physician may be 
expected to feel concern for the patient and to regard him, as 
Aristotle says, as an alter ego. 36 Their attack on the interpersonal, 
friendship model has two sides. First, they maintain that it is inconsis-
tent with the institutional character of the physician-patient relation-
ship. And second, they maintain that it overlooks "the fact of 
inequality of power between the parties, and the effect of this 
inequality on the nature of their friendship" (p. 276). 
The general argument that Ketchum and Pierce bring against the 
ethics of responsibility may be summarized as follows: the physician-
patient relationship is an institutional relationship, therefore it is a 
power relationship and as a power relationship the physician-patient 
relationship needs to be analyzed by a medical ethics based on rights 
rather than responsibilities. For ease of discussion, I shall break the 
argument down into three parts, which I shall refer to as theses, 
namely: (1) the institutional thesis; (2) the power thesis; and (3) the 
rights thesis. In my comments on these three theses, I shall try to 
show that whatever initial plausibility they might have is due to the 
ambiguities of the terms "institution," "institutional" and "power." 
When these ambiguities are cleared up, the theses and the argument as 
a whole will be seen to be a congeries of non sequiturs. 
Medicine as an Institution 
The first thesis is that "the profession of medicine is an institution 
defined by laws, practices and rules .... (And) the physician/patient 
relationship qua physician/patient relationship is therefore an institu-
tional relationship" (pp. 273-274). 
Before proceeding any further we should note that the term "insti-
tution" itself is a weasel word with a multiplicity of meanings. (And 
so, of course, is the adjective "institutional. ") As I used the word 
"institution" in LME, it referred to "an establishment, organization or 
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association" such as a hospital, a medical center or, perhaps even the 
AMA. I would suppose that the physician-patient relationship is not 
institutional in that sense! The fact that I did not discuss whether or 
not the physician-patient relationship is institutional in some other 
sense does not mean that I deny that it is institutional in any sense at 
all. Since Ketchum and Pierce fail to explain what they mean by 
"institution" and "institutional," it will be necessary for us to 
examine some other possible senses of these terms. 
To begin with, there is the sense of "institution" in which we speak 
of property, marriage, slavery, promising, etc., as institutions. We 
might call them social institutions. that is, clusters of accepted social 
rules, practices and norms defining, for example, roles and role-
relationships.37 In this sense, medicine is probably a universal institu-
tion, as is the nuclear family, for there are "doctors" in almost every 
society and culture. Institutions in this sense, i.e., social institutions, 
are "not created by laws, institutions, and government actions" (p. 
273); they existed before and independently of them, although, of 
course, they are controlled and regulated by laws, etc. But the use of 
the word "create" suggests that we are dealing with a necessary and 
sufficient condition of a thing's coming into existence; and govern-
mental action is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of 
any of the social institutions of the kind that we are considering. 
If by "institution" one means what I have called a "social institu-
tion," then I have no difficulty in admitting that medicine is an insti-
tution and that the physician-patient relationship is institutional. But 
being a social institution does not make the physician-patient relation-
ship non-personal or impersonal any more than the fact that marriage 
(courtship, parenthood) as a social institution makes the relationship 
between spouses a non-personal or impersonal relationship. Perhaps 
just being married or being in a physician-patient relationship is insuf-
ficient to guarantee that there is a personal relationship, e.g., one of 
concern and caring. On the other hand, being institutional does not 
rule it out. Rather, social institutions provide, as it were, the frame-
work for our everyday activities and relationships, telling us in very 
general terms what is and what is not to be done, what is and what is 
not to be expected, and so on. But they allow considerable leeway as 
to how things should be done . We might compare institutional norms 
to the rules of chess. You cannot play chess unless you play by the 
rules. On the other hand, playing by the rules is not enough to make 
someone a good chess player. By the same token, being a good spouse 
or a good doctor may require following rules of some sort, but that 
does not make a person a good spouse or a good doctor. To be good at 
these things requires judgment, experience, sensitivity, devotion, and 
responsibility. 
But when they say that the physician-patient relationship is institu-
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tional, Ketchum and Pierce seem to have in mind by "institution" 
something much stronger than simply a social institution; they say, for 
example, that it is "political .. . in the straight-forward conventional 
sense of being organized, constituted, and created by laws, institutions 
[sic] , and government actions" (p. 273). They go on to say that "an 
institution is a way of structuring human relationships," etc. I do not 
find the term "structure" very helpful here, because it has a number 
of different meanings. In this context, we seem to be dealing with 
something that is government-created or that by definition involves 
power relationships. If the physician-patient relationship is by defini-
tion a power relationship, then we might as well skip to thesis (2), 
because the question has been begged: to say that it is institutional 
does not add anything to the argument. But let us suppose that in 
calling the physician-patient relationship "institutional," Ketchum and 
Pierce wish simply to call attention to a strong and ethically signifi-
cant connection with government. If so, it is worthwhile asking what 
that connection is. As I have already pointed out, it is quite absurd to 
say that the physician-patient relationship itself, e.g., between indi-
viduals, is created by laws in a way that, for example, laws might bring 
into existence a new kind of financial institution or a new military 
rank. 
Now the government connection might be that some of the powers 
of physicians or of the medical establishment are "created" by the 
government. There is no question that these powers, including econ-
omic powers, have been enormously expanded through the growth of 
public bureaucracies, for example, by Medicare. But to say this is to 
say something entirely different than that the government creates the 
relationship and something that is perhaps true. It may be true, for all 
I know, that requirement of licensure by the state which, for a long 
time did not obtain, has tended to augment the power of physicians in 
society, because it has given them a monopoly. The problem of the 
social power of physicians is an important one from the point of view 
of ethics, but a problem I did not address in LME, which was con-
cerned with quite a different set of problems, namely, problems 
regarding relationships between individuals. But questions about the 
social power of physicians as a group are different from questions 
about the power of individual physicians over individual patients. I 
shall return specifically to the question of individual power when I 
examine the third thesis. 38 
Perhaps the government connection that Ketchum and Pierce have 
in mind when they say that the physician-patient relationship is insti-
tutional (structured, political) is that government regulates and 
controls the practice of medicine, as it regulates and controls many 
other activities, such as driving an automobile, getting married, or 
running a business. It is obvious that government (or legal) interven-
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tion has a significant influence on th,e character of the operations 
regulated. The effect may be to facilitllite the activity, to control the 
activity in the public interest, e.g., through licensure, to expand or to 
restrict its scope, or even to create a monopoly. But to say that by 
virtue of regulating and controlling something, government (or law) 
creates that thing, whether it be the physician-patient relationship, a 
marriage, or a business is a strange thing to say. After all, a thermostat 
controls the furnace, but it does not, on that account, create the heat 
provided by the furnace. 
The question of public regUlation and legal control leads to what 
are sometimes referred to as the physician's gate-keeper functions, 
which Ketchum and Pierce imply are important institutional aspects 
of medicine. These functions are, for the most part, created by law 
and are designed to serve the purposes of government. It is impossible 
to get born or to die -legally speaking,- without a certificate from a 
physician! Health certificates are required from physicians for various 
purposes. Physicians are authorized to prescribe certain drugs that 
laymen cannot buy without a prescription, although there are also 
drugs that even physicians are not permitted to prescribe.39 There are 
numerous legally defined gatekeeper functions such as these that are 
assigned to physicians by society, although what they are in particular 
varies from time to time and from place to place. 4o Many of these 
functions serve political and social ends that have little to do with 
medicine and that are often resented by physicians. Thus, society uses 
physicians in the USA to control the distribution of drugs and it uses 
physicians in the USSR to control who will be permitted to have a 
vacation at a seaside resort. The question that we need to ask is how 
crucial these gatekeeper functions are for an ethical understanding of 
the doctor-patient relationship. After all, there is nothing unique to 
medicine about being gatekeepers . Society assigns gatekeeper func-
tions to many different occupations - to inspectors and examiners of 
various sorts, that is, persons without whose permission one is not 
allowed to do what one wants to do. Gatekeepers are essential cogs in 
the machinery of a bureaucratic society. Furthermore, licensing is also 
a bureaucratic control device and does not automatically confer 
"political power" on the licensee; does the fact that airline pilots need 
to be licensed give them political power? 41 
Before turning to the next part of the argument, I need to make 
two general comments about the institutional thesis. First, institutions, 
in all of the senses mentioned here, can and do change. Physicians tell 
me that their relations with patients have changed quite radically in 
the last 10 years: patients expect more and are more demanding, while 
new sorts of legal and organizational requirements are imposed on 
physicians in their day-to-day practice. Thus, it is risky to be dogmatic 
about the physician-patient relationship, simply because change is in 
May, 1982 135 
the air. Second, institutions, in all senses, are subject to ethical review, 
evaluation and critique; after all, slavery was once an institution in 
American society, both a social institution and a legally sanctioned 
institution, but that fact does not vindicate it morally . By the same 
token, even by granting that the physician-patient relationship is insti-
tutional, in somewhat the same sense in which slavery used to be 
institutional, it does not follow that that is the way it ought to be 
ethically. 
In sum, with regard to the institutional thesis, none of the various 
considerations relating to institutions that have been mentioned prove 
what Ketchum and Pierce are trying to prove, namely, that the 
physician-patient relationship cannot be and ought not to be a 
personal relationship and that it is essentially a power relationship 
that, as such, overrides personal relationships. Thus, unless this thesis 
is taken to be true by definition, we need some kind of additional 
supporting evidence for it. 
Power and the Physician-Patient Relationship 
Let us now tum to the second thesis, the power thesis, namely, that 
the physician-patient relationship is a power relationship. We must 
start with the question: what kind of claims are being made for it? Is 
it always true? Usually true? Often true? True for important and 
critical cases? True where significant ethical issues are to be found? Is 
it true for primary care physicians as well as for tertiary care physi-
cians? Is it true for Russian physicians as well as American physicians?42 
At the outset, we must acknowledge the obvious empirical fact that 
there often is a power dimension to the physician-patient relationship 
as, for example, when a physician unilaterally imposes his will on a 
patient by making decisions for him that he does not want to accept 
(i.e ., medical paternalism). It is easy to see that the existence and 
exercise of this sort of power create ethical problems. The question we 
have to ask with regard to it is: what kind of power are we talking 
about when we speak of a physician's power and how is it best 
ethically to deal with this kind of medical power? 
We must first determine what Ketchum and Pierce mean by 
"power." From what they say about it, it is clear that they mean 
power in some sort of manipulative sense, that is, a kind of power that 
one person exercises over another. Power in this sense is epitomized in 
the question: who will prevail? 43 It takes for granted a zero-sum situa-
tion in which, if one person has power, then other people do not have 
any power vis Ii vis him and are, therefore, subject to him as the 
person who has the power. Given this concept of power, the crucial 
question becomes, in the words of Ketchum and Pierce: who is to be 
the "final arbiter"? Needless to say, by insisting on asking this ques-
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tion, they beg the question in favor of a particular and narrow concept 
of power. 
The particular conception of power and of decision-making that is 
implied here is founded on the Hobbesian-Lockean notion that "men 
are perpetually in competition for unequal power or wealth, all seek-
ing to invade each other." McPherson calls this notion the "bourgeois 
model of man" and the morality founded on it "bourgeois morality" 
(= the ethics of natural rights).44 It follows from this a priori model 
of human nature, which views men as naturally competitive and con-
tentious, that physicians and their patients will always be in an 
inevitable and insuperable competition for power and that whoever 
wins, or ought to win, becomes, or ought to become, the "final 
arbiter" in any medical situation. It is important to observe that the 
model in question does not simply assert that there frequently is in 
fact a play for power; no one would deny that. Rather, it posits that 
competitiveness is an essential part of human nature and of the human 
situation. 
It hardly needs to be pointed out that the Hobbesian-Lockean 
theory of human nature, even if for present purposes we restrict its 
scope to the physician-patient relationship, is not an empirical theory 
at all. No a priori theory can prove that collaboration and cooperation 
are impossible in principle. The mere fact that there often is some 
kind of "manipulation," either by physician or by patient, and that 
some sort of unilateral decision-making often takes place, such as, for 
example, the irrational refusal of treatment by a patient or the per-
formance of unnecessary surgery on the part of a doctor, does not 
prove that this sort of manipulation is necessary or inevitable. The 
model in question is simply part of a particular political ideology. 
The ethico-political theory of power taken for granted by Ketchum 
and Pierce is one that I reject for a number of reaons, but primarily 
for ethical reasons. Their assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, 
the fact is that human beings can, do, and often must collaborate and 
make decisions together. For ethical reasons, they should do so. The 
issue between us is due to our differing conceptions of power; I regard 
this as an ethical issue. For a number of reasons, I prefer to define 
power as the capacity to bring about changes in the world. 45 In this 
sense of power, new technology has greatly increased the power of 
physicians as nuclear physics has increased the power of generals. 
According to the definition that I offer here, although there may be 
competition for power, there need not be. Power in my sense can be 
shared; power in the sense assumed by Ketchum and Pierce cannot be 
shared. 
As is well-known, on the political level, the rights theory is not the 
only political theory of how to cope with excessive governmental 
power. There is an alternative, namely, the democratic theory of parti-
cipation. By analogy, on the level of individual relationships, as in the 
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physician-patient relationship, one way - I think the best way - to 
cope with excessive physician power is to have a participatory kind of 
decision-making in which all interested parties take part. 46 Under 
ideal conditions this kind of participatory decision-making is by con-
sensus. This is the model of the doctor-patient relationship that Szasz 
and Hollender refer to as the "model of mutual participation," which, 
as they say, is: "Philosophically ... predicated on the postulate that 
equality among human beings is desirable. It is fundamental to the 
social structure of democracy, etc." 47 To the extent that it is pos-
sible, this is the kind of decision-making that is called for by the ethics 
of responsibility. A responsible physician will aim for it, while a physi-
cian who, under ordinary circumstances imposes a decision unilater-
ally on others would eo ipso be irresponsible. Patients can, of course, 
also be irresponsible, although it is difficult to be irresponsible if they 
do not have any power; for, as Lukes argues, there is a close con-
ceptual relationship between power and responsibility. 48 
Ideals and Rules 
Now, I do not deny that often some kind of "manipulation," either 
by physician or patient, takes place and that, ,sometimes, we have to 
accept unilateral decisions. The ethics of responsibility and the model 
of equal participation are, however, concerned with what is ideal; as 
such, they provide a rough measuring rod for distinguishing a good 
physician-patient relationship from a bad one, a responsible physician 
from an irresponsible one, responsible (good) from irresponsible (bad) 
decision-making and, in general, responsible medical care from 
irresponsible care. It should be noted that the kind of responsibility 
involved here is moral responsibility, sometimes called "virtue-
responsibility." 49 Responsibility in this sense should not be confused 
with task, role, or official responsibility, which are simply require-
ments imposed on a person by his job. (Job responsibility is limited 
and may be non-moral or even immoral.) In the ethics of responsibil-
ity we are concerned with moral ideals and moral virtues, i.e ., what 
ought to be, and not simply with rules and jobs, i.e., what is, what is 
accepted and what is expected. 
The conception of medical decision-making that is required by the 
ethics of responsibility denies that it is always necessary to identify a 
"final arbiter," which is an essential ingredient in the analysis pre-
sented by Ketchum and Pierce. Mutual, participatory decision-making 
of the kind involved in this ethics entails candid and honest sharing of 
information and attitudes, a frank discussion of differences, and joint 
participation in the formation of, say, a treatment plan. This process 
presupposes mutual respect and trust among all the parties and 
requires extensive consultation, which itself is a process of mutual 
education, not only patient education but also physician education. 
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The position advocated here reflects the view of physicians who say 
that "ultimately the success of the doctor-patient relationship is the 
degree to which patient and physician are able to com-
municate." 50 From the ethical point of view to aim for this ideal kind 
of resolution of moral-medical problems is a moral duty of everyone 
of the parties concerned, including the physician, nurses and family, as 
well as the patient himself. 
We must remember that we are talking here about an ideal to be 
aimed at; the fact that it is not always feasible or attainable does not 
impugn its validity as a moral ideal. Sometimes it is more feasible than 
at other times. No hard and fast rules can be drawn up as to how or 
when what it requires is to be done, for circumstances and values vary 
so widely. However, as a moral ideal, everyone who is involved must 
constantly bear in mind the end-in-view, namely, the patient's well-
being, which is not only a function of his purely physiological needs, 
but also of his psychological, social and moral needs. What my critics 
seem to have overlooked in their comments on LME is my insistence, 
there and elsewhere, that a patient's welfare includes his "security, 
health, education and moral integrity" and that to be responsible 
means to be responsible for all of these. 51 Thus, forcing a person to 
do what he firmly believes to be wrong, e.g., making a Jehovah's 
Witness have a blood transfusion or making a physician perform what 
he knows to be an unnecessary operation, is a violation of their moral 
integrity, a concept which, I think, is much deeper, richer and more 
basic than the concept of rights in the strong sense, which I claim is 
derivative from it. 52 I should add that part of moral integrity requires 
sharing one's concerns for oneself and for others and accepting the 
responsibility for what they entail. In this way, and in many others, 
we come back to the concept of responsibility, which I believe is basic 
to this kind of ethics. 
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